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OBSERVERS AS PARTICIPANTS: LETTING THE PUBLIC 
MONITOR THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE BUREAUCRACY 
Stephanos Bibas∗ 
Of late, many criminal justice scholars have bemoaned the substi-
tution of plea bargains for jury trials.  Where citizens once sat in 
judgment as part of a public morality play, now professionals and bu-
reaucrats hurry cases along a swift, hidden assembly line from charge 
through plea to sentence.  These bargains efficiently process huge 
dockets, but at tremendous cost to the system’s legitimacy, morality, 
and monitoring of its agents’ performance.  In response, scholars often 
wish either to dynamite the entire edifice or to recreate mini-juries 
within stages of the criminal justice machine. 
Professor Jocelyn Simonson’s Article sees this problem but identi-
fies an important solution that is already hiding in plain sight: the au-
dience.  The First and Sixth Amendments seek to make the criminal 
justice transparent and participatory, and not only through profession-
al media.  The right is not simply one of the organized press or of de-
fendants, but of the public as a whole.  Sunlight is the best disinfectant 
— but our system tries to black out the passive solar energy that al-
ready shines into the gloomy corridors of justice as friends, relatives, 
and kibitzers come to watch routine proceedings.1 
This Response argues that Simonson’s argument can and should be 
taken further to buttress the public’s right to see justice done.  First, I 
explain the point of the right: to enable the public not merely to ob-
serve, but also to participate in doing justice.  After articulating this 
right as one of both defendants and the public, and exploring its outer 
boundaries and waivability, I identify the broader principal-agent dy-
namic that public access may allay.  Finally, I extend Simonson’s rea-
soning: her reframing and expansion of the public’s right of access to 
courtrooms is not only logical, but also reinforces the role of the Sixth 
Amendment speedy-trial guarantee as well as prudential concerns 
about criminal justice’s technicality and obscurity. 
If the public had a mere right to information or data, the press 
could fill that role, or broadcasting over closed-circuit television or the 
Internet could suffice.  But Simonson’s argument is more ambitious, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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 1 Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 HARV. L. REV. 
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because it understands spectators as participants, who not only see jus-
tice done but take part in doing it.2  The goal is not simply a fully in-
formed citizenry, but a participatory morality play. 
The logical extension of Simonson’s argument, it seems, is that the 
rights to watch, hear, and maybe even comment are structural checks 
that serve the public’s interest in seeing justice done and in helping to 
do justice itself.  Though the Sixth Amendment is cast as a right of de-
fendants and so might be waivable, the First is not.  Defendants, then, 
should not be able to waive the right to an audience unilaterally. 
Understandably, Simonson is no absolutist and recognizes the need 
for exceptions.  Several categories of cases raise difficult questions of 
line-drawing.  First, there are cooperating witnesses and others who 
fear retaliation for their testimony, particularly in cases involving or-
ganized crime and gangs.  The public has an undeniable interest in 
hearing these witnesses in order to check abuses, such as perjury, ex-
cessive leniency, and the skewing of enforcement toward victimless 
drug dealing.  At the same time, pure transparency would chill much 
cooperation, allowing reigns of terror to silence witnesses who would 
otherwise do their civic duty to come forward.  And often the only rea-
son prosecutors are willing to offer a favorable plea is in exchange for 
preserving an undercover officer’s or informant’s cover so that he can 
continue to root out more crime.  Full transparency would thwart such 
undercover work.3 
Second, there are vulnerable victims and witnesses, particularly 
victims of rape, domestic abuse, and child molestation.  Requiring 
openness across the board might keep many of them from coming for-
ward in the first place, making them even more powerless and allow-
ing defendants effectively to silence their accusers. 
Third, some defendants are ashamed or embarrassed enough that 
they are unwilling to plead guilty or be sentenced in the presence of 
their friends, family, or victims.  They may be in denial to others or 
even to themselves.  Closing hearings or courtrooms may help to facili-
tate their guilty pleas.4 
Judges must handle some such cases in chambers, sidebar confer-
ences, or sealed courtrooms.  But the default rule should be one of 
openness, or at least as much openness as is compatible with physical 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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safety.  I am suspicious of closing courtrooms for court administrators’ 
mere convenience or for the third category of cases above, where de-
fendants seek to avoid public shame and private guilt.  If they are 
barred from seeing the proceedings, victims and the public may feel 
that the defendant has cheated justice.  The defendant’s friends and 
relatives may believe that he was unjustly convicted — still maintain-
ing, for instance, that the rape victim consented or asked for it.  And 
defendants who never have to confront their victims or the public may 
remain in denial about the wrongfulness of their own acts or their 
need for reform.  As twelve-step programs such as Alcoholics Anony-
mous teach, in order to overcome an addiction or similar problem, one 
must admit that he has a problem in the first place.  Letting defend-
ants avoid such shame may harden their denials, impeding treatment 
in prison and so increasing recidivism.  That problem is especially 
acute for defendants who seek to slide through the system with no-
contest pleas, which neither admit nor deny guilt, or Alford pleas, 
which affirmatively protest innocence.5 
The broader dynamic here is a disjunction in the criminal justice 
system between the principals (victims, defendants, and members of 
the public) and their agents (police, prosecutors, judges, and defense 
lawyers).  The agents evidently prefer to move cases through the sys-
tem quickly, sometimes secretly, and without public monitoring or in-
terference.  Defendants’ friends, relatives, and victims are annoying 
inconveniences, grit that slows down the assembly line.6  But the pub-
lic rightly wants to monitor and check the performance of its public 
servants and the quality of justice they administer.  Citizens also want 
their day in court, to see justice done.  That is a powerful and endur-
ing metaphor, one that should shape court processes far more than it 
currently does. 
Simonson’s argument should lead us to consider two related prob-
lems.  The first is delay.  Justice delayed is justice denied, and the 
Sixth Amendment expressly guarantees speedy trials so that victims, 
defendants, and the public may see justice done promptly.  Yet judges 
and lawyers have become too comfortable with letting cases drag on 
for years, sometimes for their own scheduling convenience.  A greater 
concern for the public interest might lead to accelerating charges, con-
victions, and punishments.  Perhaps the speedy-trial guarantee ought 
to be seen as an unwaivable structural check, a right of the public to 
follow cases, participate, and hold officials accountable.  (The Supreme 
Court recognized the public’s interest in speedy trials in Barker v. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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Wingo,7 but never gave the right enough bite to make it meaningful.)  
At the very least, routine continuances ought to require more justifica-
tion than just the parties’ consent. 
The second problem is technicality.  As our legal system has grown 
increasingly professionalized over the last two centuries or so, rules of 
evidence, procedure, and substantive law have proliferated and grown 
technical and opaque.  In the federal system and (to a lesser extent) in 
many states, a spectator at a sentencing hearing will hear the judge 
drone on about offense levels, aggravating and mitigating adjustments, 
criminal-history scores, and points.  This mathematical gobbledygook 
can at least partly obstruct the common-sense moral judgment and 
evaluation of the criminal and his crime, as well as his remorse and 
amends.8 
Lawyers instinctively trust intricate rules as the surest path to fair-
ness and equality, mistrusting the masses and fearing discrimination.  
Yet, as I have argued elsewhere, rules have hardly banished discrimi-
nation, and lawyers are too quick to disparage the public’s sense of 
justice and fairness, including virtues such as mercy.9  Moreover, pub-
lic access can promote representation of minority communities that are 
under-represented among criminal justice professionals. 
Courts will never banish legalese entirely or translate it thoroughly.  
But they can still do much more to simplify rules and translate them 
into plain English.  Ideally, audience pressure and reactions to patterns 
of unfair verdicts would even push courts back toward liability, de-
fense, and punishment rules that accord with lay retributive intuitions.  
(Perhaps audience members might blog and tweet their complaints, 
leading to snowballing media coverage and generating electoral pres-
sure on prosecutors and legislators to reform.)  Intelligibility would 
thus increase not only fairness but also democratic legitimacy.  Both 
procedural and substantive fairness help to increase the legal system’s 
legitimacy in the public’s eyes, fostering public compliance and  
cooperation.10 
In short, Simonson’s Article is an important contribution to appreci-
ating the public’s role in criminal justice today. Spectators are not pas-
sive, but active — not warm bodies, but citizens engaged in monitoring 
criminal justice. If they can watch, hear, and understand everyday hear-
ings, they can monitor, understand, and improve criminal justice. Our 
system is far too opaque, technical, and hidden. But even modest re-
forms to let the sun shine in would be steps in the right direction. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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